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ABSTRACT
Existing steganographic ﬁle systems enable a user to hide the
existence of his secret data by claiming that they are (static)
dummy data created during disk initialization. Such a claim
is plausible if the adversary only sees the disk content at the
point of attack. In a multi-user computing environment that
employs untrusted shared storage, however, the adversary
could have taken multiple snapshots of the disk content over
time. Since the dummy data are static, the diﬀerences across
snapshots thus disclose the locations of user data, and could
even reveal the user passwords.
In this paper, we introduce a Dummy-Relocatable Stegano-
graphic (DRSteg) ﬁle system to provide deniability in multi-
user environments where the adversary may have multi-
ple snapshots of the disk content. With its novel tech-
niques for sharing and relocating dummy data during run-
time, DRSteg allows a data owner to surrender only some
data and attribute the unexplained changes across snapshots
to the dummy operations. The level of deniability oﬀered
by DRSteg is conﬁgurable by the users, to balance against
the resulting performance overhead. Additionally, DRSteg
guarantees the integrity of the protected data, except where
users voluntarily overwrite data under duress.
1. INTRODUCTION
Steganographic File Systems (stegfs) are intended to pro-
vide plausible deniability to data owners in the event that
they are forced to disclose their secret data [4]. A stegfs
hides encrypted user data among dummy data that contain
only pseudo-random bits. Without the correct password, it
is not possible to diﬀerentiate user data from dummy (based
on the assumption that the output of the block cipher is in-
distinguishable from random bits [3, 4]), even for an adver-
sary who understands the mechanisms of the ﬁle system and
is able to gain access to the storage devices. This feature al-
lows a data owner to selectively reveal some directories/ﬁles,
but disclaim the existence of his sensitive data.
To be believable, the disclaimer of the data owner must be
consistent with the information that the adversary is able to gather 
about the ﬁle system. This is much more challenging to achieve in 
modern computing environments when the user data are 
encrypted and stored in shared network storage. Compared to 
portable and local storage, network storage dramatically increases 
the availability and accessibility of user data. However, it also 
brings new challenges in securing user data. With shared network 
storage, the adversary is no longer limited to a single snapshot of 
the disk content at the point of attack. Instead, the adversary could 
now locate the physical server machines being used [17] and 
quietly amass multiple snapshots of the ﬁle system over a period of 
time before launching his attack. The additional knowledge that 
the adversary gleams from the multiple snapshots must be factored 
into the stegfs design.
In earlier stegfs designs [4, 15, 12, 16], dummy data are
created when the disk is formatted and remain static there-
after. These schemes are eﬀective against adversaries who
only see the ﬁnal state of the storage, but cannot defend
against adversaries who possess multiple snapshots of the
storage. Indeed, changes among diﬀerent snapshots not only
reveal the location of secret data, but could even be uti-lized
to recover the access keys (for example, when the ﬁrst scheme
by Anderson et al. [4] is utilized). Recent stegfs schemes,
which are proposed to defend against multiple-snapshots
attacks, either cannot guarantee the integrity of user data
even under legitimate data operations [8, 9], or re-quire a
trusted agent to manage all the user passwords and dummy
data [20], which eﬀectively presents a single point of
disclosure for user passwords.
In this paper, we propose a multi-user stegfs for shared
storage systems, which is named as DRSteg – Dummy Re-
locatable Steganographic ﬁle system. DRSteg is designed to
meet the following requirements:
• Security: To provide plausible deniability of secret
data in a multi-user environment in which the adver-
sary could obtain multiple snapshots of the storage
content. This protection should extend to any user
even when the storage server and all the other users
are completely compromised, i.e., they have surren-
dered all the information in their possession.
• Usability: To guarantee data integrity, and at the same
time enable individual users to trade oﬀ between deni-
ability and system performance.
To the best of our knowledge, DRSteg is the ﬁrst stegfs that
allows I/O operations observed on shared storage to be 
plausibly attributed to dummy data without requiring a trusted 
agent as used by Zhou et al. [20]. In addition, our work also 
manages to increase the deniability provided to in-dividual users 
by sharing dummies among multiple users in the system. It is 
technically challenging to satisfy both the security and usability 
requirements, especially when dum-mies are shared. DRSteg 
incorporates a special dummy relocation mechanism that enables 
individual users to dis-tinguish dummies from other users’ data (in 
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order to free dummies without destroying data), and to 
prevent adver-saries from discerning the diﬀerence between
dummy and user data even after obtaining multiple
snapshots.
This is also the ﬁrst work that formalizes the deniability
achieved by a multi-user stegfs. The formalization enables us
to develop a tunable mechanism for users to balance be-
tween deniability and system responsiveness. In DRSteg, the
deniability enjoyed by individual users could be main-tained
beyond a speciﬁed threshold, whether or not all the other
users are fully compromised. The amount of dummy
operations is controlled individually; a user who speciﬁes a
more aggressive amount enjoys higher deniability at the
expense of slower ﬁle operations.
To substantiate the usability of DRSteg, we present re-
sults of an empirical evaluation using ﬁle operation logs col-
lected from 12 graduate students in our school. The results
conﬁrm that DRSteg is capable of achieving a wide range of
user-speciﬁed deniability levels. We also implemented a pro-
totype of DRSteg as a ﬁle system module in Linux kernel.
Performance experiments on the prototype show that secu-
rity and performance can be traded oﬀ against each other.
2. RELATED WORK
Cryptographic ﬁle systems (e.g., [5, 7, 11, 19]) and their
implementations (e.g., [1, 2]) have been studied extensively
in the last two decades . A cryptographic ﬁle system comple-
ments the access control mechanism of the operating system
(OS). Even if the OS is compromised or the data storage is
removed from the OS, data in the ﬁle system remain pro-
tected by the user’s password. A weakness of cryptographic
ﬁle systems is that they leave evidence of the existence of
encrypted data, so a determined attacker may compel the
users to reveal their decryption passwords.
In order to provide plausible deniability of the existence of
secret data, Anderson et al. proposed two steganographic ﬁle
system (stegfs) schemes [4]. In the ﬁrst scheme, the disk is
initialized with several cover ﬁles that have equal length and
contain random data. A secret object is stored through an
exclusive-or operation on a subset of the cover ﬁles, iden-
tiﬁed by the corresponding bits in the access key. To protect
against brute force attacks, the number of cover ﬁles must be
suﬃciently large; this imposes heavy I/O overheads as each
read/write request for an object translates into opera-tions
on multiple cover ﬁles. The scheme is eﬀective against single-
snapshot attacks but not multiple-snapshot attacks. In
particular, the diﬀerences between just two snapshots of the
storage can expose the access key used1.
In Anderson’s second scheme [4], the disk is ﬁrst ﬁlled with
random bits. Subsequently, secret data blocks are written to 
pseudorandom addresses. An implementation of this scheme on 
Linux is reported by McDonald et al. [15], a peer-to-peer version 
by Hand et al. [12] and a distributed version by
1This is because only cover ﬁles whose indexes correspond
to bits with value “1” in the access key will be modiﬁed for
any data modiﬁcation. Those ﬁles which do not change will
correspond to bits with value“0” in the access key. Thus, the
access key can be reconstructed by observing the changes of
the cover-ﬁle matrix in the storage.
Giefer et al. [10]. The disadvantage of the scheme is that the
probability of collision in the locations where data are stored
increases as more data are added to the disk. Although
replicating each data block in diﬀerent locations reduces the
likelihood of data loss, the risk cannot be eliminated; hence
data integrity is not guaranteed.
Pang et al. [16] utilized a bitmap to track block alloca-tion
to avoid overwriting data and to improve system perfor-
mance. To defend against single-snapshot attacks, dummy
data are added when the disk is initialized. The dummy data
cannot be changed or relocated at runtime, so the scheme is
susceptible to multiple-snapshot attacks. Zhou et al. [20]
provided for the relocation of dummy blocks. Their solution
requires a trusted agent to manage all the user passwords and
dummy data, which eﬀectively transfers the risk of pass-word
disclosure to the agent.
Diaz et al. [8] proposed to defend against traﬃc analy-sis
[18] through a mix-based stegfs that employs a local mix to
relocate ﬁles in the remote storage. They show that the
security of the scheme depends on the ﬁle-size patterns in
the system. Another work by Domingo-Ferrer et al. [9] ad-
dressed the problem of data loss in a stegfs with multiple
users. It is not designed to defend against multiple-snapshot
attacks though. Furthermore, neither of the two schemes
guarantees data integrity under legitimate data operations.
TrueCrypt2, an open-source disk-encryption software pack-
age, enables a user to create a deniable ﬁle system within a
regular encrypted ﬁle or partition. The ﬁle system is deni-able
if the adversary only sees the ﬁnal content of the disk.
However, it cannot defend against an adversary who pos-
sesses multiple snapshots of the encrypted partition. The same
weakness exists in similar products that provide deni-ability
for secret ﬁles, e.g., Phonebook3 and Rubberhose4.
Note that deniability in stegfs is diﬀerent from deniable
encryption [6] which allows an encrypted message to be
decrypted into diﬀerent sensible plaintexts with diﬀerent
keys. Stegfs is also diﬀerent from private information re-
trieval (PIR) [13] which allows a user to retrieve an item from
a server without revealing which item is retrieved. A stegfs
allows the untrusted server to be cognizant of which disk
blocks are retrieved, yet provides deniability that they
stemmed from operations on secret data. A stegfs is not de-
signed to prove non-existence of secret data but to provide
plausible deniability of the existence of secret data.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 Threat Model
Figure 1 depicts our model of a multi-user ﬁle system. In the
model, user data are stored on a shared storage. The stegfs
functionalities are implemented in the client module that runs
on the user computers. This client module is se-cured so that
sensitive data that are operated on as well as any passwords
used for encrypting and decrypting the data are protected.
The storage server manages the shared stor-
2TrueCrypt, http://www.truecrypt.org/
3Phonebook, http://www.freenet.org.nz/phonebook
4Rubberhose, http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org
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Figure 1: A multi-user stegfs with untrusted shared
storage
age devices which provide block-level operations, including
DAS (direct attached storage) and SAN (storage area net-
work). Diﬀerent from the model where the server manages
all the user passwords [20], the storage server and shared
storage in our model are not stegfs speciﬁc.
The server and the storage devices are not trusted. This
means that an adversary may inﬁltrate the server or the
storage devices directly (or the backup of these devices) to
copy and analyze the stored content. Although our scheme
provides better protection when the communication between
users and the server is anonymized, it is not a necessary
condition for DRSteg to provide deniability to users. We will
analyze the deniability of DRSteg under diﬀerent scenarios
in Section 5.
In this paper, we focus on adversaries who are after the
user data, and we explicitly rule out considerations of sab-
otage like overwriting/deleting data and denial of service.
The threat posed by the adversary thus hinges on two fac-
tors: (a) his knowledge of the ﬁle system state, and (b) his
access to the users of the system. These two factors together
determine the adversary’s ability to make deductions about
the hidden data on the storage, and to verify any claims
elicited from the users.
The ﬁrst factor, knowledge of the storage state, is char-
acterized by the number of observations of the storage con-
tent. An adversary who is able to access the storage only
once (i.e., at the point of attack) only gains a single snap-
shot of the storage. An example is someone who is cap-
tured by criminals and forced to reveal all the contents in
his portable drive. However, when the adversary has more
than one chance to access the storage, he can record mul-
tiple snapshots. The information in those snapshots is then
utilized to deduce the existence of secret data.
The second factor that deﬁnes the adversary’s ability con-
cerns his access to the users. Here, we make the following
assumption:
Victim isolation assumption. In coercing information from
the users, it would be eﬀective for the adversary to in-
terrogate them separately and cross-check the information
elicited. Placed in isolation, a victim knows neither which
other users have been compromised nor what information
they have surrendered. Consequently, each victim has to
assume the worst, i.e., that all the other users are compro-
mised and all their secrets are revealed. He thus has to
independently decide what data he can hide without being
contradicted by other users’ disclosure.
Multi-user encrypting ﬁle systems [2, 5, 7] are inadequate
under the victim isolation assumption, as it is not safe for a
user to claim his data to belong to someone else. A solution
is to use dummy blocks, which should be operated on in
similar ways as encrypted data blocks in order to defend
against multiple snapshot attacks.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Deniability
To formalize the threat, an adversary has access to a se-
quence of snapshots S = {s1, s2, . . . , sT} of the stegfs parti-
tion on the disk, where sT is the snapshot at the time of
coercion. Following the victim isolation assumption, the ad-
versary extracts all the passwords from other users (P′) at
the time of attack, and also coerces the victim to reveal his
passwords Pt = {p1, p2, . . . , pt}. The adversary then utilizes
the passwords obtained to decode the information in each
snapshot.
Let Hdummyi and H
data
i denote the hypotheses that an al-
located block blki is a dummy block and a data block, re-
spectively. Let ei denote the evidence on blki observed from
S, and E = {ei} the aggregate evidence across all the disk
blocks. We deﬁne the plausible deniability of blki as follows.
Definition 1. Given the evidence E = {ei} = S∪P′∪Pt,
where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sT} is a sequence of snapshots taken
by the adversary and P′ ∪Pt is the set of passwords revealed
to the adversary (along with the blocks decrypted with these
passwords), the deniability of an allocated block blki is the
posterior probability that ei was generated by operations on
dummy block blki:
denyi = Pr(H
dummy
i |ei) (1)
A steganographic ﬁle system is said to be α-deniable if
denyi ≥ α
for all blki that cannot be decrypted with P
′ ∪ Pt, for any
t ≥ 1 of the user’s choice.
An α-deniable stegfs guarantees that any evidence gath-
ered by an adversary (e.g., disk images across multiple snap-
shots) is caused by dummy data operations with at least a
probability of α. This means that a user of the system can
attribute the evidence to dummy operations without reveal-
ing his secret data.
4. DESIGN OF DRSteg
DRSteg is designed to enable a user to selectively disclose
some of his data, while enjoying α-deniability for the rest
of the data that he is withholding from the adversary. We
begin this section with an overview of the DRSteg design,
before presenting the detailed data structures and imple-
mentation considerations.
4.1 Overview of DRSteg
In DRSteg, each user must be able to protect his data
with diﬀerent passwords, so that he can surrender some data
but not others. To achieve α-deniability for the data blocks
that he is withholding, our approach is to (a) enforce a joint
ownership for allocated disk blocks to prevent the adversary
from associating with certainty a withheld block with any
particular user, and (b) introduce dummy blocks that are
operated on at runtime, so that changes to the withheld
blocks can be plausibly explained by dummy operations.
We realize the joint ownership through a voting protocol.
For every allocated block, m ownership shares are created
and distributed to m users, including the user who requested
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for the block (also known as the creator). A block can sub-
sequently be altered or freed only after all the m shares
have been garnered from consenting owners. By following
this policy, we ensure that the block is never deallocated
without the creator’s share, yet the creator of the block is
obfuscated among the share owners. The creator may use
an allocated block either for his data or as a dummy.
For each user, the disk blocks that hold his data are pro-
tected by one of his passwords p1, p2, . . . , pn. The number
of passwords n is expected to vary from user to user, though
we use the same symbol n across users for brevity. More-
over, the passwords are generated as a hash chain [14], i.e.,
pl = h(pl+1) for a hash function h and 1 ≤ l < n (as il-
lustrated in the upper part of Figure 2). By supplying any
password pl, 1 ≤ l ≤ n, the user can access all the secret
data at and below level l.
As for those disk blocks that are allocated as dummies,
no bookkeeping information is maintained to track them
directly; otherwise, the adversary can simply demand the
bookkeeping information from the users, and with it discover
the dummy blocks in the ﬁle system. Instead, a dummy
block can only be identiﬁed through the cooperation of its
owners: Each shareholder of the block checks whether it is
protected with one of his passwords; if not, the block is a
potential dummy – it may indeed be a dummy, or it may
hold the data of some other user. It is freed in the same way
as data blocks, i.e., after gathering m shares.
In the event of an attack, our DRSteg design allows a
coerced user to supply some password pt, 1 ≤ t < n, to the
adversary and deny the existence of the passwords pj for
t < j ≤ n. The data blocks that are protected by pj then
appear to be potential dummies, thus enabling the user to
hide the existence of the data.
4.2 Detailed Design of DRSteg
Drawing on the approaches introduced above, we now put
together the concrete DRSteg design. Each user u keeps
track of a set of blocks Au on which he currently holds a
share. Moreover, each password pl protects a set of data
blocks Du,l. The set diﬀerence Au −∪lDu,l gives the blocks
that exclude u’s data, and dummy blocks are the allocated
blocks that contain nobody’s data, i.e., ∩u(Au − ∪lDu,l).
Figure 2 depicts our detailed design for DRSteg (the en-
cryption is done at the granularity of individual blocks).
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Figure 2: Key management and user view of the
storage
Whenever a user u requires a disk block blk from the ﬁle
system to write data or dummy patterns, a free disk block
is allocated and shares of the block are also created. One
share is given to u, while the remaining shares of blk are
distributed to other users u′, i.e., Au ← Au ∪ {blk} and
Au′ ← Au′∪{blk}. If user u encrypts data with his password
pl and stores it in blk, then Du,l ← Du,l ∪ {blk}.
Any user u may propose the deletion of a block in his Au.
The deletion is eﬀected only after all the users who hold
shares of the block have acquiesced. Obviously, if the block
holds the data of user u′, he would relocate the data before
supporting the deletion. This is to avoid leaving clues for
diﬀerentiating between dummy and data blocks.
With DRSteg, user u can surrender any password pt, 1 ≤
t < n and claim that data blocks in Au − ∪1≤j≤tDu,j are
not his data. Claiming that data blocks in Du,j for t < j ≤
n are dummy blocks is plausible since they also appear in
Au′−∪lDu′,l of other users u′ who hold shares of the blocks.
4.2.1 Joint ownership of blocks
We implement the joint ownership of disk blocks through a
voting protocol and two data structures – a set of encrypted
user share boxes (USB) and a global voting table (GVT) in
clear text. A USB is used to track the Au of each user, and
a GVT records the votes surrendered by users. Two other
structures are additionally maintained in clear text in the
storage: a list of the users’ public keys, and a bitmap to
track the allocation status of the disk blocks.
When a user allocates a disk block blki, he 1) sets the
bit of this block to “1” in the bitmap; 2) creates m shares
and writes them to the corresponding USBs; 3) writes the
encrypted/random data content to the block. The format of
each encrypted share is given as E(Kpub,u, i), an encryption
of i with a user’s public key. The encrypted shares denote
the ownership of this block. A block blk ∈ Au if the share
E(Kpub,u, i) exists in the USB of user u. The m owners of
a block include the creator and m− 1 other users randomly
selected from the public-key list.
Any of the m owners can subsequently initiate the dele-
tion of the block blk by writing i to the global voting table
(GVT) and removing his share from his USB. To support
the deletion, other owners also contribute their shares into
GVT. When the number of accumulated shares of a block
reaches m, this block can be removed from GVT and its
bit in the bitmap is set to “0” (indicating that this block is
free). The share constitution ensures that the block can be
deallocated only when block creator signals his agreement
by surrendering his share to the GVT.
4.2.2 Management of data blocks
In order to provide plausible deniability against multiple-
snapshot attacks, disk blocks that contain data must be
managed carefully so that they leave the same evidence as
operations on dummy blocks.
First, consider the modiﬁcation of secret data. By com-
paring snapshots, the adversary may discover that the con-
tent of a block changes before all the m shares are added
into GVT. This would never happen to a dummy block ac-
cording to our voting protocol. Therefore, instead of over-
writing data blocks, each user always migrates his updated
content to new blocks, and initiates the deletion of the out-
dated blocks in GVT so that they will be freed in due course.
However, the initiation of the deletion operation is delayed,
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in order to break the temporal correlation between the allo-
cation of new blocks and the deallocation of outdated blocks.
Next, consider the case where some user’s data block is
registered for deallocation in GVT by other users. If the
user never concurs, the adversary will suspect that the block
contains data, since deallocation of dummy blocks are sup-
ported readily. To avoid suspicion, the user has to migrate
the content to a fresh disk block, before relinquishing his
share to the old data block.
In real implementations, the block creating operations are
carried out immediately, but the voting (including removing
shares from USB and writing block numbers into GVT) are
delayed. We pass the voting operations to a background user
process that survives beyond user log-oﬀ. The background
process repeatedly initiates the deletion of a block in its
pool after sleeping for a random duration. This makes the
operations for data blocks plausible since the creation and
voting could be caused by either creating and freeing dummy
blocks or creating, modifying and freeing data blocks.
4.3 Discussions
4.3.1 Comparing to naive designs
There also exist alternatives in designing a multi-user stegano-
graphic ﬁle system. A naive one could simply let each user
manage his own blocks (including data and dummy). Since
dummy blocks are no longer shared, one has to create many
more dummy blocks in order to achieve the same deniabil-
ity compared to our design, when anonymous channels are
used between the users and the storage server. When this
channel is not anonymized, our design still provides similar
security and disk utilization compared to the naive design.
The deniability provided by DRSteg under both scenarios is
analyzed in the next section.
4.3.2 Encryption of the block shares
Another security issue relates to the encryption of the
shares in USB. If the shares are stored in clear text, it will be
straightforward for an adversary to identify who the owners
of any particular block are. By encrypting the shares, the
owners of any block are obfuscated so long as multiple blocks
have been allocated between snapshots. In this way, our
approach safeguards shareholders from being earmarked to
be the next target of coercion.
4.3.3 Organization of the user passwords
The last design issue concerns the organization of the user
passwords. One option is to have only one password in each
account and to give every user multiple accounts. Under
coercion, a user reveals some of his accounts and tries to hide
the remaining ones. However, this simple option fails when
the adversary captures all the users of the system. When
that happens, the adversary can check whether there are m
shares among the surrendered accounts for every allocated
block; if not, there must exist more user accounts. This
is why we choose to allow multiple passwords (for diﬀerent
security levels) in each user account.
Organizing multiple passwords in a hash chain has been
proposed in other stegfs [4, 10, 16], and its one-way prop-
erty meets our requirements well. Under coercion attack,
the disclosure from surrendering t independent passwords is
the same as giving up the t lowest-level passwords in a hash
chain. Thus, in our system design, the hash chain mecha-
nism is chosen due to the performance and usability beneﬁts
gained compared to independent passwords.
5. PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY OF DRSteg
Having introduced the design of DRSteg, we now quantify
the deniability it provides under a spectrum of progressively
challenging attack scenarios. Based on the last and most
demanding scenario, we then show how to operationalize the
DRSteg design so as to sustain the system security above
user-speciﬁed deniability thresholds. Table 1 summarizes
the terms and notations which are used in the analysis.
5.1 Analysis of Deniability
We ﬁrst expand Equation 1.
denyi = Pr(H
dummy
i |ei) =
Pr(ei|Hdummyi )× Pr(Hdummyi )
Pr(ei)
(2)
According to our problem formulation in Section 3, the ad-
versary is capable of taking multiple snapshots of the storage
content. He may also augment the snapshots with secrets
that he coerced from one or more users. The following attack
scenarios diﬀer on the amount of secrets thus extracted, and
deserve particular attention in deploying DRSteg. These
scenarios will be further evaluated in Section 6. In the fol-
lowing analysis, we consider the case where the evidence
contains two snapshots. The analysis extends easily to mul-
tiple snapshots. Note that Equation 2 implicitly takes the
frequency of these snapshots into consideration by evaluat-
ing ei, i.e., the more frequently snapshots are taken, the more
information ei would include.
5.1.1 Passive-adversary scenario
In this scenario, the adversary may be curious and has not
resorted to force, or he may not be ready to expose himself
just yet. Thus he only relies on the snapshots collected,
i.e., the evidence E = S. By comparing any two recorded
snapshots (s1, s2), the adversary could observe a lot of user
activities, e.g., new blocks being created, deleted, and etc.
Let us ﬁrst consider the creation of new blocks. A block
blki is created between s1 and s2 if ﬂagi changes from 0 in s1
to 1 in s2. Let crt
data represent the net number of data blocks
created between s1 and s2, and crt
dummy the net number of
dummy blocks created in the same period. ttls2 , ttl
dummy
s2 ,
and ttldatas2 denote, respectively, the total number of allocated
blocks, the total number of dummy blocks, and the total
number of data blocks in s2. Given an evidence that blki is
newly allocated, the probability that blki is a dummy block
in s2 is calculated with Equation (2) as
denyi =
crtdummy
ttldummys2
× ttl
dummy
s2
ttls2
/
crtdata + crtdummy
ttls2
=
crtdummy
crtdata + crtdummy
This derivation extends to block deletion and other evi-
dence listed in Table 2. Denoting the number of data/dummy
block operations between s1 and s2 by op
data and opdummy, the
deniability can be calculated as opdummy/(opdata + opdummy).
For an individual user u in DRSteg, let opdatau denote the
number of data blocks operated on in ∪lDu,l between s1
and s2, and op
dummy denote the number of dummy blocks
operated on in the system. The deniability that DRSteg
provides for u under this scenario is expressed as
denyu,i =
opdummy
opdatau + op
dummy
(3)
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Notation Explanation
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sT} Snapshots (of the stegfs partitions) taken by the adversary.
Pt = {p1, p2, . . . , pt} Passwords revealed to the adversary under coercion.
E = {ei} = S ∪ P′ ∪ Pt Evidence possessed by the adversary.
sk = {BLK,USB,GVT}k
BLK = {blki}: Blocks in the stegfs partition (blki is the i-th block).
USB = {USBu}: User share boxes (USBu is the USB of user u).
GVT: Global voting table.
blki = 〈texti, ﬂagi〉
texti: If blki is dummy, texti contains random bits;
If blki holds user data, texti = E(p,plaintexti)
ﬂagi: A ﬂag indicating whether blki has been allocated.
Hdummyi , H
data
i Hypothesis that blki is a dummy/data block in sT.
Table 1: Summary of notations used
Evidence DRSteg operation
ﬂagi changes from 0 to 1 and new shares appear in some USBs Create blki as a new dummy or data block
A share of blki is moved from USBu to GVT User u votes to delete blki
ﬂagi changes from 1 to 0, and blki’s entry is removed from GVT Delete blki as enough votes are present in GVT
Some combination of the above Some combination of the above
Table 2: Evidences and the corresponding DRSteg operations
5.1.2 Anonymous-channel scenario
Once the adversary starts to coerce users, by the victim
isolation assumption in Section 3, one has to assume that all
of the users have been captured and be wary about oﬀering
conﬂicting information to the adversary. In this scenario, we
consider a victim u who discloses the passwords for up to
level t of his ﬁles and attempts to hide his remaining data,
when all the other users are compromised (E = S∪P′ ∪Pt).
We assume that all the user requests where sent through
an anonymous channel to the storage server, so that the
adversary is not able to trace each request to a speciﬁc user.
With all the passwords of every user except u, the adver-
sary not only sees all the data of the other users, he also
uncovers the dummy blocks for which the ownership is lim-
ited to those users. The only outstanding blocks are those
on which u holds a share (Au). Figure 3 illustrates the dis-
tinction between various groups of blocks in the system, and
also the ones used in the calculation of denyu,i.
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Figure 3: System view of allocated blocks
Taking into account the organization of the user data into
diﬀerent password levels n and Pt, operations on data blocks
in level t and below are disclosed to the adversary. Let
opdatau,l denote the number of data blocks in Du,l, and op
dummy
u
denote the number of dummy blocks recorded in USBu. The
deniability of a user u (who has revealed pt) is a function of
the undisclosed blocks held by him:
denyu,i =
opdummyu∑
l>t op
data
u,l + op
dummy
u
(4)
The disclosed passwords do not aﬀect opdummyu in the above
equation. Therefore, a bigger t improves the deniability for
the data of user u being withheld from the adversary. This
is intuitive, since a bigger t means that there is less user
data to be hidden among the ﬁxed pool of dummy blocks.
5.1.3 Worst-case scenario
When the user-server channel is not anonymized and the
storage server is compromised by the adversary, the adver-
sary is able to distinguish the creator from other share hold-
ers by monitoring the requests sent to the server. Under
such a scenario, a user cannot utilize the dummy blocks
that are not created by himself to provide deniability for his
secret data (even if he is one of the owners of these dummy
blocks). This leads to the worst-case deniability denyu,i for
DRSteg since opdummyu in Equation 4 only contains dummy
blocks created by user u himself.
5.2 α-deniable DRSteg
We now show how to operationalize the dummy manipula-
tion mechanism to secure DRSteg under the worst-case sce-
nario described above. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate how to
manipulate dummy data to maintain the deniability above
a given threshold αT , thus making DRSteg αT -deniable.
5.2.1 Number of Dummy Blocks to Manipulate
Let σu,l = op
dummy
u,l /op
data
u,l . The number of dummy blocks
operated on by u, opdummyu =
∑
l op
dummy
u,l =
∑
l op
data
u,l × σu,l.
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Substituting into Equation (4), we have
denyu,i =
∑
l(op
data
u,l × σu,l)∑
l>t op
data
u,l +
∑
l(op
data
u,l × σu,l)
(5)
In order to ensure that every blki ∈ Au meets the denia-
bility threshold of αT no matter which password level user
u chooses to surrender, we need
denyu,i =
∑
l(op
data
u,l × σu,l)∑
l op
data
u,l +
∑
l(op
data
u,l × σu,l)
> αT
Simplifying the above equation, we get
σu,l >
αT
1− αT (6)
Since σu,l = op
dummy
u,l /op
data
u,l , Equation (6) implies that to
achieve the target deniability threshold αT , the number of
dummy blocks manipulated must be at least αT
1−αT times
opdatau,l , the number of data operations.
5.2.2 Controlling dummy operations
Having determined the number of dummy blocks to ma-
nipulate, we give the procedures for controlling the dummy
manipulation in DRSteg in order to achieve the deniability
conﬁgured by users.
There are three types of operations on the dummy blocks
– creating, deleting and voting – among which dummy cre-
ation is the easiest to control. When a user logs in at security
level l, he conﬁgures σl (which is bigger than
αT
1−αT ). If x
free blocks are allocated for creating or modifying a secret
ﬁle, then after a random delay, the DRSteg client creates
x · σl dummy blocks to maintain the deniability.
Deletion is more complex because a user does not know
which blocks are really dummy blocks (he can only identify
blocks that are not his data, as illustrated in Figure 2). To
conceal the deletion of x data blocks, the DRSteg client has
to delete x · σl dummy blocks. This is done by moving the
shares of x · σl randomly selected blocks in Au − ∪lDu,l
from USBu to GVT after a random delay. Although some
of these x · σl blocks may be data blocks of other users,
the respective data owners will turn these (data) blocks into
dummy anyway as explained next.
Now suppose that user u′ logs in, and discovers that a
block blk ∈ Au′ has been put up in GVT for deletion. If blk
does not contain his data, i.e., if blk ∈ (Au′ − ∪lDu′,l), u′
will support the deletion by adding his votes on blk in GVT.
If blk is a data block of u′ (i.e., blk ∈ ∪lDu,l), then u′ has
to migrate the content to a new block before voting for the
deletion. As discussed in Section 4.2, this is to avoid leaving
clues that blk contains user data.
5.2.3 Security Discussions
There are several security concerns relating to dummy ma-
nipulation. First, in our current design, every block opera-
tion is either a direct data operation or the eﬀect of a data
operation. Besides introducing random delays, their associ-
ation could be masked by breaking each of the dummy cre-
ations and block deletions into smaller steps and interleav-
ing them with data block operations. In addition, DRSteg
could initiate dummy operations independently of data op-
erations. These enhancements will be incorporated in future
work.
Second, the parameter σu,l is of special interest to the
adversary, who might force the victims to reveal their choices
of σu,l. With the σu,l values, the adversary may estimate
the actual number of data block operations, thus limiting the
victims’ ﬂexibility to attribute as dummy those data blocks
that they are trying to hide. To substantiate his denial in the
event of an attack, DRSteg furnishes each user u with a fake
σfakeu,t at log-out, where t is the password level that the user is
willing to disclose. σfakeu,t is calculated as the ratio between the
number of blocks claimed to be dummy (including dummy
blocks and hidden data blocks), and the number of revealed
data blocks: σfakeu,t = (Σl>top
data
u,l + op
dummy
u )/Σl≤top
data
u,l .
Another potential security threat is, if the adversary is
able to take snapshots of the storage content with inﬁnitesi-
mal delay, he may be able to distinguish dummy blocks from
data blocks. Troncoso et al. [18] showed that this distinc-
tion is possible because data blocks belonging to the same
ﬁle are often accessed one after another, whereas dummy
blocks are accessed individually and are not likely to ex-
hibit the same access pattern. To mitigate against such a
threat, one possible solution is to introduce dummy ﬁles into
DRSteg. A dummy ﬁle would span several dummy blocks,
which are then accessed sequentially like data blocks. In or-
der to present similar access pattern as data ﬁles, dummy
ﬁles should also be accessed frequently. Such an improve-
ment in dummy ﬁle operations is left for future work.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Empirical Evaluation on Deniability
To investigate DRSteg’s ability to maintain user-speciﬁed
deniability thresholds under multiple-snapshot attacks, we
perform an empirical evaluation by re-playing ﬁle operations
logged in a typical oﬃce environment. We deployed a logger
to record the ﬁle operations (operation type and time) on
the computers of 12 graduate students in our lab. Over 9
days, we recorded more than 50,000 user ﬁle operations5.
We begin by mirroring the user ﬁles of all 12 computers
in DRSteg, which add up to about 1 Tbyte of data. We
also initialize the same number of dummy blocks, making
the original utilization of data blocks 0.5. The shares for
data and dummy blocks are distributed randomly among
the 12 users. We assume that users are automatically logged
out from the stegfs system after some period of inactivity
(10 minutes in our experiments), and they login again right
before their next observed data operations. For each session,
the user enters the password to one of his security levels l
(randomly chosen by our simulator) and picks a σu,l value
(chosen to follow a power-law distribution p(σ) ∝ L(σ)σ−ξ
assuming that more users will tend to choose lower σ values
to minimize overhead). We set αT = 0.4, σmin = 0.7 and
ξ = 3.0 for all users. The parameters and statistics are
summarized in Table 3.
We use the ﬁrst two days of logs to warm up DRSteg.
As the remaining seven days of traces are executed, we take
a snapshot of the disk image every 10 minutes. Figure 4
shows the deniability for one of the (randomly chosen) users
by comparing each successive snapshot with the ﬁrst one.
Figure 4(a) shows the deniability under the passive-adversary
scenario, calculated with Equation 3. The upper graph gives
5We assume that the operating system and software pro-
grams are not installed in the stegfs partition.
323
Parameter Value User-log Statistics Value Simulated DRSteg Statistics Value
# of users 12 Total logging time 9 days Initial amt. of data blocks 1011.34 GB
αT 0.4 # of ﬁle operations 50,113 Initial amt. of allocated blocks 2022.68 GB
# of security levels 5 Data blocks created 26.613 GB # of user sessions 294
Interval before auto logout 10 mins Data blocks deleted 80.069 GB Final amt. of data blocks 970.60 GB
Avg. # of shares per block 3 Data blocks modiﬁed 160.317 GB Final amt. of allocated blocks 1995.89 GB
Table 3: Simulation parameters and statistics
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(a) Passive-adversary scenario
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Figure 4: Deniability of DRSteg under diﬀerent scenarios
the deniability with respect to block creation evidence, while
the lower is for delete operations. As seen from the graphs,
sharing dummy blocks among users enables individual users
to enjoy high deniability.
Next, we examine Figure 4(b) for the anonymous-channel
scenario, which is calculated with Equation 4. Here, the
selected user has revealed up to level t of his passwords
(the lines in the graphs represent diﬀerent settings of t),
whereas the other users have revealed all their passwords.
Since the selected user can only rely on the operations on
dummy blocks which are recorded in his UMB, the deniabil-
ity is lower than that in the previous scenario. Nevertheless,
DRSteg still manages to achieve high deniability.
Turning to the worst-case scenario where the adversary is
aware of the creator of every block, Figure 4(c) shows the
deniability levels achieved. In this scenario, deniability is
derived solely from operations on the dummy data created
by the user himself, which explains the much reduced deni-
ability. Even so, DRSteg manages to keep the deniability
above the conﬁgured threshold of αT = 0.4.
The deniability for the other 11 users are similar to the
results in Figure 4 quantitatively and qualitatively. In par-
ticular, the lowest deniability observed for the worst-case
attack scenario is 0.46. These results aﬃrm the security
property of our proposed DRSteg.
6.2 Implementation and Performance Evalu-
ation
We have implemented DRSteg as a ﬁle system module
in parallel with ext3 in Linux kernel 2.6, on the client ma-
chines which communicate with the shared storage through a
server (see Figure 1). The client module manages the blocks
in the shared storage automatically according to the pass-
word entered by the user. This includes creating new data
and dummy blocks (and allocating shares to other owners),
voting blocks for deallocation, etc. We explain below how
the storage is organized by the system and benchmark the
performance of DRSteg.
6.2.1 File system construction
In our DRSteg ﬁle system, the (remote) disk storage is
partitioned into blocks of 1 Kbyte in size by default. A
bitmap tracks the allocation status of the blocks: 1 corre-
sponds to an allocated block and 0 a free block. An allocated
block is either a dummy or a data block, both of which ap-
pear to contain random patterns.
To accelerate access to directories and ﬁles, DRSteg uses
a designated storage area, called the super block (see Fig-
ure 5), to store inode structures so that they can be located
eﬃciently. The super block is essentially a mini-DRSteg
system for the addresses of inode roots, and is calved into
ﬁxed-size slots that are capable of holding one address each.
A slot may be a free slot, a dummy slot, or may contain
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Figure 5: Block organization in DRSteg
the encrypted address of an inode root (with redundancy
so that it is distinguishable from random bits upon decryp-
tion). Each password level of a user is allocated one slot.
Since the super block is expected to be only a few Kbytes
in size, it can be scanned quickly to ﬁnd the inode roots for
each user. The super block has its own bitmap to track slot
allocation, while it shares the same set of user share boxes
and the global voting table with the main ﬁle system.
6.2.2 Performance Evaluation
The key parameters of the computing hardware for our
experiments are listed in Table 4, while Table 5 summarizes
the workload parameters and their default settings.
The ﬁrst experiment is designed to study how well DRSteg
performs. For comparison, we include StegCover, StegRand [4]
and NSteg [16] as baselines. StegCover is conﬁgured with 20
cover ﬁles (the authors recommended 16 to 100 [4]). For Ste-
gRand, we use a replication factor of 4 to reduce the prob-
ability of data loss [15]. NSteg is set to populate 30% of
the disk with dummy blocks during initialization. We also
include two settings of the native Linux ﬁle system (ext3) in
our tests. In the CleanDisk setting, data ﬁles are loaded into
a freshly formatted native Linux partition, so that the ﬁles
occupy contiguous disk blocks; with ﬁle operations translat-
ing to sequential I/Os, CleanDisk gives the best-case tim-
ings. In contrast, results of FragDisk are obtained with
a well-used ext3 partition in which the free space is frag-
mented.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we conﬁgure DRSteg with σu,l =
0.25, which produces a worst-case deniability of 0.2. For a
given concurrency level, we generate ﬁle creation requests
one after another for each user and measure the elapse time.
Figure 6(a) shows the average write time for various ﬁle
systems, with the number of concurrent users ranging from
1 to 32. Every performance result is averaged over 1000
observations.
The results show that StegCover is the worst performer;
this is because each ﬁle operation translates into disk I/Os
on several cover ﬁles. StegRand is also slow because it has
to modify all the replicas. DRSteg and NSteg use a bitmap
to track the status of disk blocks, so they can ensure data
Parameter Value
CPU Intel Duo Core 2.53GHz
RAM 2GB (1GB DDR2-667 x 2)
Hard Disk SATA 7200rpm, 250 GB with 8MB cache
Table 4: Hardware Parameters
Parameter Default Value
Capacity of the test partition 40 Gbytes
Size of each disk block 1 Kbytes
Number of blocks for each ﬁle 1024
File access pattern Interleaved
Table 5: Workload Parameters
integrity with just one copy of each data ﬁle. Consequently,
they are substantially faster than StegCover and StegRand.
They are slower than FragDisk though, because they encrypt
the protected ﬁles block by block and spread them across the
disk, resulting in higher fragmentation.
Recall that DRSteg needs to write additional messages
into the UMB’s during block creation and generate dummy
operations dynamically. As the ﬁle creation requests in our
experiment are issued one after another with no delay, the
ﬁle system is fully loaded, leaving no idle period for DRSteg
to schedule its dummy operations. Thus, the dummy opera-
tions add directly to the write times, and the observed tim-
ings represent the worst-case performance of DRSteg. For
example, with σu,l = 0.25 it is roughly 30% slower than
NSteg. This is the cost paid by DRSteg to achieve better
security protection, compared to NSteg which is not able to
relocate its dummy blocks.
In the second experiment, we investigate the performance
of DRSteg under diﬀerent load conditions. The load con-
dition is determined by various factors, including the σ pa-
rameter that controls the amount of dummy operations, the
concurrency level, and the activity level of each user. We
model the activity level after a Poisson process with mean
arrival rate of λ block operations per minute. The results
are summarized in Figure 6(b), which plots the average write
time against λ for several σ-concurrency combinations.
We ﬁrst consider the impact of λ. For every σ-concurrency
combination, DRSteg’s write time is short initially because
there are ample lull periods during which dummy opera-
tions can be scheduled so as to reduce contention with data
operations. Such opportunities diminish with increasing λ,
leading to longer write times observed in the ﬁgure. Next,
we compare the three σ-concurrency combinations with σ =
0.25. With the same σ and λ settings, raising the concur-
rency level introduces more contention between the data and
dummy operations and lengthens the write time. Similarly,
a bigger σ generates more dummy operations to cover the
data operations, again resulting in longer write times.
In summary, our experiment demonstrates that DRSteg
is capable of striking a wide range of trade-oﬀs between
deniability and system performance. If high deniability is
required, the ﬁle system should be conﬁgured with enough
resources to prevent it from becoming overloaded. On the
other hand, to support a heavy workload, we could conﬁgure
DRSteg for a lower deniability assurance.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the threat to steganographic
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Figure 6: Performance evaluation results
ﬁle systems (stegfs) that arises when the underlying stor-
age is untrusted and shared by multiple users. In such sys-
tems, an adversary could obtain and analyze multiple snap-
shots of the storage content to deduce the existence of secret
user data. To counter the threat, we introduce a Dummy-
Relocatable Steganographic (DRSteg) ﬁle system that em-
ploys novel techniques to share and relocate dummy data
at runtime. This enables users to surrender only some of
their data, and attribute any unexplained changes across
snapshots to dummy operations. The deniability enjoyed by
users is conﬁgurable individually. DRSteg guarantees the
integrity of the protected data, except where users voluntar-
ily overwrite data under duress. A trace-driven simulation
conﬁrms the security of our scheme. Further experiments
on a Linux prototype demonstrate that DRSteg is able to
eﬀectively trade oﬀ deniability with system performance.
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